APDH v Côte d’Ivoire (2016) 1 AfCLR 668 689 however, that objection should have been raised ‘at the latest before the date fixed by the Court for the filing of the first set of pleadings to be submitted by the party who intends to raise such objections’, that is, at the latest during the month of December 2014 (see paragraph 22 of the judgment; and yet, this first pleading to be submitted by the Respondent State, i.e. its Brief in Response filed on 19 May 2015 (without any Application for extension of time) contained no preliminary objection. Although that brief was filed out of time, the Court decided to accept the same “in the interest of justice” (see paragraphs 24, 25 and 26 of the judgment). The plea of inadmissibility on grounds of non-exhaustion of local remedies contained in the afore-mentioned Additional Observations was therefore raised outside the time limit prescribed by Rule 52(2) and, indeed, subsequent to the closure of the written procedure. The Court also decided to accept Respondent State’s additional observations still “in the interest of justice” (see paragraph 31 of the judgment). 4. In my opinion, the Court should have explained the term “interest of justice” which it invokes in this case, more so because the preliminary objection in question was raised after the closure of the written procedure on 8 January 2016 (see paragraph 30) and because the Applicant formally opposed the filing44 of the said observations. Proper administration of justice requires that the time limits prescribed by the Court must be scrupulously respected by the parties, especially where such time limits concern a procedural aspect as crucial as the Court’s jurisdiction or an Application’s admissibility. This does not mean that the Court cannot show flexibility in certain circumstances; it must however ensure that cases are properly managed and that it keeps control of the procedure. In the instant case, the Court could have indicated that exhaustion of local remedies is a cardinal condition for admissibility of an Application and that it therefore behoves the Court to examine this condition even in the absence of an objection by the Respondent State in this regard (see Rule 39 of the Rules of Court).55 In view of its fundamental nature, this condition of admissibility could indeed be likened to a condition in respect of public order. 5. I would now address the two key questions which led me to write this separate opinion. I. The Independent Electoral Commission’s lack of independence and impartiality 6. Article 17(1) of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, violation of which is alleged, provides that; “State Parties shall establish and strengthen independent and impartial national electoral bodies responsible for the management of elections”. Since this instrument does not contain a definition of the concepts of 4 5 See his Pleadings Paper dated 3 March 2016, pp. 6-7 and the Record of Proceedings of the Public Hearing of Thursday 3 March 2016, pp 5-6 (Mr Guizot Takoré’s pleadings). Paragraph 1 of this Article provides that “the Court shall conduct a preliminary examination of its jurisdiction and the admissibility of the Application…”