APDH v Côte d’Ivoire (2016) 1 AfCLR 668 697 33. In the instant case, the Court could not make a ruling regarding the violation of ECOWAS Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance, the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in the absence of the Applicant’s claims regarding the violation of these three instruments. 34. In any event, the Court’s decision on the violation by the Respondent State of ECOWAS Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance, the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights was not necessary. The Court having in effect held that the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance is “a relevant human rights legal instrument”, it could interpret and apply only that instrument. Having held in conclusion that the instrument had been breached, such a conclusion was sufficient to meet the Applicant’s request. 35. The requirement that a court should not exceed its jurisdiction by refraining from ruling ultra petita must be as imperative in the field of human rights as it is in strictly interstate litigation. In my view, it is a public order and legal security related requirement that must prevail over all other considerations. Any exception to this principle of ultra petita fundamental procedure runs the risk of undermining the principle of equality of the parties, the imperatives of proper administration of justice and, hence, the confidence reposed by the parties in the judicial institution. 36. In a trial before a human rights court, the judge may, of course, show flexibility with respect to an Applicant who is an individual or a non-governmental organization. The judge may, for example, “adjust” or “interpret” an Applicant’s request for the purpose of identifying a right allegedly infringed. That is what the Court did in the present case by finding that the Respondent State violated the right “to equal protection of the law” (see paragraphs 146-151 of the judgment and point 6 of the operational part), whereas the Applicant only alleged the violation of the right to “equality before the law” (see its Additional Submission dated 4 40 41 November 201540 and its pleadings of Thursday 3 March 2016).41 37. There is indeed a difference of nature between the two rights, reason for which the said two rights are enshrined separately by the 42 African Charter42 or the International Covenant on Civil and Political 43 Rights,43 for example. In the instant case, it is not the right to equality of all before the law or the equal Application of the law that was at issue, but rather the right of everyone to equal protection of the law. It was therefore up to the Court to rigorously distinguish between the two 40 Additional Brief, pp. 1-7 and 11 (see supra note 28). 41 Mr Guizot Takoré’s Pleadings, Record of Proceedings of the Public Hearing of Thursday 3 March 2016, pp. 4, 11 and 12; see also the Pleadings document dated 3 March 2016, pp. 15-17 and 23. 42 Article 3: “1. Every individual shall be equal before the law. 2 Every individual shall be entitled to equal protection of the law”. 43 Article 26: “All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law ...”.