TLS and Others v Tanzania (merits) (2013) 1 AfCLR 34 45 The objection based on lack of jurisdiction on the ground that the Protocol was not yet operational at the time of the alleged violation of the 2nd Applicant’s rights: The 2nd Applicant argues that a distinction has to be made between normative and institutional provisions. The rights sought to be protected were enshrined in the Charter to which Respondent was already a party at the time of the alleged violation; although the Protocol came into operation later, it was merely a mechanism to protect those rights. The Charter sets out rights while the Protocol provides an institutional framework for enforcement of those rights. The Applicant stated that it is not the ratification of the Protocol that establishes the rights, rather these rights existed in the Charter and the Respondent has violated them and continues to do so. The issue of retroactivity therefore does not arise. IV. The Court’s ruling on admissibility 82. Lack of exhaustion of local remedies 82.1 The Court is of the view that, in principle, the remedies envisaged in Article 6(2) of the Protocol read together with Article 56(5) of the Charter are primarily judicial remedies as they are the ones that meet the criteria of availability, effectiveness and sufficiency that has been elaborated in jurisprudence Thus, in Communication Nos 147/95, 147/ 96 Sir Dawda K. Jawara v The Gambia, Thirteenth Annual Activity Report (1999-2000) at paragraph 31, the African Commission stated that: “Three major criteria could be deduced in determining [the exhaustion] rule, namely: the remedy must be available, effective and sufficient.” In Communication No 221/98 Alfred B Cudjoe v Ghana, Twelfth Annual Activity Report (1998-1999) at paragraph 13, the Commission had earlier stated that: “[T]he internal remedy to which Article 56(5) [of the Charter] refers entails a remedy sought from courts of a judicial nature.” In the case of Velásquez-Rodríguez v Honduras, Judgment of 29 July 1988, Series C No 4 paragraph 64, the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights stated that: “Adequate domestic remedies are those which are suitable to address an infringement of a legal right. A number of remedies exist in the legal system of every country, but not all are applicable in every circumstance. If a remedy is not adequate in a specific date, it obviously need not be exhausted.” In a similar vein, the European Court of Human Rights in Akdivar and Others v Turkey Application No 21893/93, Judgment of 16 September 1996, paragraph 66 stated that: “To meet the exhaustion requirement normal recourse should be had by an Applicant to remedies which are available and sufficient to afford redress in respect of the breaches alleged. The existence of the remedies in question must be sufficiently certain not only in theory but in practice, failing which they will lack the requisite accessibility and effectiveness.” 82.2 The 2nd Applicant contends that he has exhausted local judicial remedies since the judgment of the Court of Appeal, which is the final court, set aside the judgments of the High Court that had declared the prohibition of independent candidates unconstitutional. The 1st Applicants argued that it was not necessary for them to institute an action challenging this prohibition as the outcome would have been the same. The Respondent did not join issue on the 1st Applicants’