TLS and Others v Tanzania (merits) (2013) 1 AfCLR 34 65 association and the right of citizens to freely participate in the government of their countries would consequently be those required to ensure “respect for the right of others, collective security, morality and common interest”. 32. One can thus conclude that, according to the African Charter, the freedom of association and the right to freely participate in the government of a country are not absolute as the exercise of such rights is subject to limitations by the States Parties. One can equally conclude that the powers of limitation by States Parties are also not absolute in that they must comply with certain requirements: the restrictions must be provided by law and should be necessary to ensure “respect for the rights of others, collective security, morality and common interest”. 33. Consequently, it lies with the Respondent State to show that the restrictions it has applied to the freedom of association and the right to freely participate in the government or the country were not only provided by law but also necessary to ensure “respect for the rights of others, collective security, morality and common interest”. 34. Such proof has, however, not been forthcoming from the Respondent State. That is what the Court ought to have expressed in a clearer manner particularly with regard to the right to freely participate in the government of the country. Paragraphs 109 in fine, 111, 113 and 114 of the Judgment indeed suggest that the barring of independent candidates from certain elections and the correlative obligation to belong to a political party are in “themselves” violations of Articles 10 and 13(1) of the Charter, whether or not such limitations are reasonable. The reasoning of the Court would had been clearer if its various sequences and the corresponding paragraphs of the Judgment were positioned in a more coherent manner so as to show that it is the fact that the limitation to the rights concerned were unreasonable that led the Court to the conclusion that the said rights had been violated. Paragraph 109, in particular, is not at its right place in the reasoning of the Court (it should be located upstream) and paragraph 108, for part, addresses issues which are extraneous to the instant case. 35. Having found that Articles 10 and 13(1) of the Charter had been violated, the Court could only have concluded that there was violation of the principles of non-discrimination and of the equal protection of the law as enshrined in Articles 2 and 3(2), respectively. 36. The principle of non-discrimination, on one hand, and the principles of equality before the law and of equal protection of the law, on the other, are in close relationship. They are so to say the two sides of the same coin, the first principle being the corollary of the second ones. Their main difference under the African Chatter lies in their respective scope. Indeed, according to Articles 2 and 3 of the Charter, the principle of non-discrimination applies only to the rights guaranteed in the Charter, whereas the principles of equality apply to all the rights protected in the municipal system of a State party even if they are not recognized in the Charter. 37. ln the instant case, the Court should have started its reasoning by clearly indicating this distinction and stating that the alleged discriminations actually relate to two rights guaranteed in the Charter.