set out briefly above (at [43]) – but only in the end result (cf, for example, the absence of discussion of O 1 r 2(5) of the Rules of Court (reproduced at [46] above)). However, if my respective interpretations of r 3 (as a “gap-filling” provision) and r 13 (as a mandatory provision) are correct, there is no need to have recourse to Mr Chan’s argument. And, in the light of my reading of, inter alia, these rules, Mr Ravi’s argument (at [56] above) cannot succeed. The argument that reasonable steps were taken to furnish security 110 I turn, next, to Mr Ravi’s argument that the plaintiff had taken reasonable steps to furnish the requisite security for costs under r 13 and hence ought not to be penalised. With respect, I do not find this particular argument even slightly convincing in the least for the following reasons. 111 Firstly, as I have already pointed out above (at [91]), the plaintiff took steps to furnish the requisite security for costs only after the present application was taken out by the defendant. 112 Secondly, it was the plaintiff who had brought the substantive application in the first instance. In the words of Lee J in the Chong Thain Vun case (quoted at [32] above), “[p]eremptory language is used by the rules and it behoves a petitioner to study the rules carefully so that every provision is complied with”; and as the learned judge proceeded to observe (at 74): If there is a breach of the provision of this rule, it makes no difference whether the petitioner has misinterpreted or misunderstood it he must take the risk. The respondent is entitled to take advantage of a petitioner’s faults. The provisions of this rule must be strictly complied with. 113 Reference may also be made to the equally pertinent observations of Skinner J made in a similar vein in the Charlee Soh case ([33] supra, and as quoted at some length at [34] above). 114 I should add that even on a general level, I find that the plaintiff’s arguments in this particular regard have, with respect, no merit. It would be more appropriate to state them in the conclusion to this judgment, which I do (see [115]–[118] below). I will point out that one ought not to be misled by superficially attractive arguments of sympathy without also examining closely the entire context, which also includes the rights of other interested parties, amongst other considerations. Conclusion 115 It is the duty of every court to sift the legal wheat from any (and all) irrelevant chaff. The “irrelevant chaff” in this particular instance comprised bare appeals by the plaintiff for sympathy without reference to either the relevant law or the fact that what she requested in her application involved serious legal issues and consequences. The plaintiff sought to paint the picture of one who was a mere layperson – ignorant and helpless. With respect, this was a wholly one-sided version of events which cleverly omitted to give – as common fairness required – a full as well as accurate picture that placed all the circumstances in their proper context. The fact of the matter was that this was a serious application which was submitted to the Registry of the Supreme Court in proper legal form by the plaintiff. She had initiated the main proceedings and was obviously clear about what she intended to achieve from a legal point of view (and see [1] above). To reiterate, the key issue in these proceedings was whether r 13 was a mandatory one. It clearly was for the reasons I have set out above. It was not a mere “optional extra”. The plaintiff clearly failed to comply with r 13. To accommodate the plaintiff in the present proceedings out of what would in any event be a misguided and arbitrary exercise of sympathetic feelings is to ignore, blatantly, a clear and mandatory legal rule, for which (as I have pointed out above) there is an equally clear (and no less significant) rationale. Indeed, it is precisely this clear rationale that furnishes the legal rule with its underlying spirit of