case”), held that the equivalent of our r 16 was mandatory – a proposition that was, not surprisingly, in these circumstances and in the face of the authority of the Board, conceded by counsel for the petitioners, Dato’ David Marshall. Notwithstanding counsel for the petitioners’ argument that his clients had done all that was reasonably possible to comply with the rule, the learned judge held (at 71) that “[s]trict compliance with the rules is necessary as [the rule] is mandatory” and that therefore the respondents were entitled to succeed on the motion on this ground. Two observations may be appropriate at this juncture. 26 The first is that the Devan Nair case has been applied in many decisions since, notably, in the Singapore High Court decision of Re Telok Blangah Election [1980–1981] SLR 509. Indeed, the holding in the Devan Nair case with regard to the legal status of the specific rule in question (r 16 of our PER) has stood the test of time and cannot now be seriously controverted. 27 Secondly, the specific holding just referred to is not only consistent with the language and spirit of the particular rule itself but also illustrates the important point that if a rule in the PER is held to be mandatory, then there is no real room for manoeuvre or flexibility, even if the sympathy of all concerned is with the party who had failed to comply with the rule itself. This is an important general point of principle, to which I shall therefore have occasion to return later in this judgment. 28 Returning to the Chong Thain Vun case, in so far as the latter ground was concerned (centring on the non-compliance with the equivalent of r 13 of our PER), Lee J held that, having regard to his holding with regard to the first ground, “it would be unnecessary to go into the question of insufficiency of security” (at 73). Nevertheless, the learned judge proceeded immediately to observe thus (ibid): However as the matter is of some importance and out of respect to the arguments so ably put by counsel I think I should deal with it. 29 I hasten to add that it was fortunate (particularly in the context of the subject matter of the present proceedings and for courts in future cases generally) that the learned judge did in fact delve into this particular issue in greater detail. He observed thus (ibid): Non compliance with this rule may result in the dismissal of the petition depending upon the respondent’s action. The object of this rule is clearly to see that a petitioner provides adequate security for costs. In my opinion rule 12 [the equivalent of r 13 of our PER] is clearly mandatory. [emphasis added] 30 Lee J’s observations on this point gave rise, in my view, to the further question of why adequate security for costs was itself stipulated to be necessary under r 13. When posed with this particular question, Mr Chan responded by stating that there were two specific purposes underlying r 13 itself. The first was to ensure that the plaintiff’s action was not frivolous or vexatious. The second was to protect the defendant (in the event that he or she was successful) in so far as costs of defending the application under s 90 was concerned, since the action had been initiated by the other party in the first instance. But, as I shall point out below, there is an even more important reason – which goes to the very core of a defendant’s rights in the context of an application to declare an election void (see [75] below). 31 In the Chong Thain Vun case, Lee J also observed (at 74) that the equivalent of our r 13(4): … gives the court power to make an order of dismissal. It was said that the power is discretionary. As I read the rule it seems that the power arises only on the application of a