moment, a significant point that arises on a plain reading of the provision itself – which is, in fact, my second point, to which I now turn. 72 Secondly, and as I have just mentioned, there are in fact two specific timelines prescribed within r 13(1) itself. The first is that security shall be payable “at the time of the filing of the application”. Presumably, this is the most efficient scenario envisaged. It also presupposes that the plaintiff, having taken the time and trouble to file an application under s 90 of the Act, has also taken the time and trouble to acquaint himself or herself with all the relevant procedure – including the provision of security as required under r 13. I pause here to note that such an application is indeed a very specific and specialised one. It is specific because it relates to a very special procedure impugning a result in an event that does not take place every other day, to put it mildly. It is also specific because it is not only an attempt by the plaintiff to vindicate his or her rights but is also an attempt (simultaneously) to impugn and presumably take away the rights of another party (here, of the successful candidate who would normally be the defendant to such an application). I shall elaborate more on this point below as well as in the conclusion to this judgment because it goes to the very root of the concept of rights itself – viewed not merely in the abstract but in a very real and practical context. It will suffice for the present to reiterate the fact that, given, inter alia, the very specific and specialised nature of the context and its concomitant proceedings, there is a clear underlying assumption that the plaintiff would indeed be prepared, simultaneously with his or her filing of an application under s 90 of the Act, to furnish the requisite security pursuant to r 13. 73 However, and this is where the Legislature has in fact built in a very limited exception which takes the form of a second (and alternative) timeline, if the plaintiff does not in fact furnish the requisite security pursuant to r 13 at the time of the filing of the application, then there is a further grace period of three days to do so. This is embodied in no uncertain terms by the words “or within 3 days afterwards” [emphasis added] in r 13(1) itself. This further grace period presumably permits the plaintiff some extra time to garner the necessary funds. However, given the special nature of the proceedings and the need (as we have seen above in the relevant case law) for a speedy determination of the proceedings, it is an extremely limited (and, I might add, extremely specific) period of three days – no more, and no less. It is nevertheless an additional period that has been expressly stipulated in r 13(1) itself. 74 It is clear, in my view, that the Legislature, having stipulated two extremely specific timeframes in equally clear language, intended that these timeframes be adhered to strictly. In other words, the general requirement under r 13 in general and the specific timeframes stipulated in r 13(1) in particular are mandatory. There was no intention to provide for any further flexibility, nor is any indicated within the express language of r 13(1) itself. 75 I turn, now, to a related point, which I have in fact already alluded to above. Once again, this point does not appear to have been canvassed in the relevant case law although it seems to me to be one that arises clearly not only on the face of the language of the various provisions of the Act itself but also from the spirit underlying those various provisions. And that is the need to be conscious, not only of the plaintiff’s rights, but also of the rights or interests of the defendant which a re impugned by an application under s 90 of the Act. As has already been noted, the present proceedings do not constitute a “normal” election petition (see [47] above). I do not wish to state more here since this leads naturally on to issues that are not before me in the present proceedings, viz, whether or not the plaintiff had filed an application against the wrong defendant in the present proceedings and whether or not (as a closely related point) the thrust and spirit of the Act (read in both logical as well as historical contexts) envisaged applications under s 90 being brought only in relation to the results of specific constituencies, and not the entire General Election in toto. Be that as it may, it cannot, in point of fact, be denied that the present application is not “normal” inasmuch