The elusive historical approach of characterising procedural provisions as either directory or mandatory is largely anachronistic today. The preferred approach in modern times in determining the validity of an Act is to understand the purpose of the relevant procedural rule as well as the scope and intent of the governing statute. This approach does not entail ignoring the usage of words such as “shall” or “must” in legislation. It suggests that any prima facie inference raised by such words may be dislodged after taking into consideration the scope and objectives of the legislation and the consequences arising from alternative constructions. 82 Indeed, this is precisely the approach that I have adopted in the present proceedings, and which, incidentally, was also the approach adopted by Lee J in the Chong Thain Vun case ([25] supra at 73). It might, nevertheless, be helpful to observe that words such as “mandatory” and “directory” are still helpful inasmuch as they assist in focusing on the nature of the provision concerned and (more importantly) on the consequences of non-compliance with it. However, such words do not, in and of themselves, aid substantively in the process of ascertaining whether or not the provision concerned is indeed “mandatory” or “directory”. In this regard, there is no substitute for a close analysis of the language of the provision itself set in its legislative context. 83 The approach just suggested also finds some support in the English Court of Appeal decision of Ahmed v Kennedy ([36] supra), which was referred to earlier in this judgment. In that case, Simon Brown LJ, cited (at [29]) Lord Woolf MR (as he then was) in Regina v Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex parte Jeyeanthan [2000] 1 WLR 354 at 362, where he described the then Master of the Rolls as observing that “[the] dichotomy [between “directory” and “mandatory” provisions] is ‘only at most a first step’ and that further questions then arise to help the court decide whether in any given case non-compliance ought properly to be held fatal so as to oust the court’s jurisdiction in the matter”. The learned lord justice then reiterated (ibid) the same approach which was endorsed in the preceding paragraph, as follows: Rather, however, than spend time circling around the ultimate question, I propose to address it directly: does this legislation on its true construction give the court a discretion to waive these petitioners’ timeous non-compliance or must it be regarded as fatal to their proceedings? 84 Turning now to a separate point, the historical context is, in my view, also instructive. The (present) Act has its source as far back as 1947: see the Singapore Legislative Council Elections Ordinance 1947 (No 24 of 1947) (“the 1947 Ordinance”). In particular, r 13 of the PER (found, it will be recalled, in the Fourth Schedule of the Act) corresponds to r 12 in the Third Schedule of the 1947 Ordinance. I pause to note that there were no changes effected to this rule when the 1947 Ordinance was replaced a few years later by the Singapore Legislative Assembly Elections Ordinance 1954 (No 26 of 1954) (“the 1954 Ordinance”). 85 Rule 13(2) of the PER reads as follows: The security shall be to an amount of not less than $5,000. If the number of charges in any application exceeds 3, additional security to an amount of $2,500 shall be given in respect of each charge in excess of the first 3. [emphasis added] 86 Rule 12(2) of the Third Schedule of the 1947 Ordinance (and, subsequently, of the 1954 Ordinance) read as follows: The security shall be to an amount of not less than one thousand dollars. If the number of charges in any petition shall exceed three, additional security to an amount of five hundred dollars shall be given in respect of each charge in excess of the first three. The security required