Security by plaintiff for cost, etc., of application under section 90
13.—(1) At the time of the filing of the application under section 90, or within 3 days afterwards,
security for the payment of all costs, charges and expenses that may become payable by the
plaintiff shall be given on behalf of the plaintiff.
(2)
The security shall be to an amount of not less than $5,000. If the number of charges in
any application exceeds 3, additional security to an amount of $2,500 shall be given in respect of
each charge in excess of the first 3.
(3)
The security required by this rule shall be given by a deposit of money.
(4)
If security required by this rule to be provided is not given by the plaintiff, no further
proceedings shall be had on the application under section 90, and the defendant may apply by
summons to the Judge for an order directing the dismissal of the application under section 90 and
for the payment of the defendant’s costs.
(5)
The costs of hearing and deciding the defendant’s application under paragraph (4) shall
be paid as ordered by the Judge, and in default of such order shall form part of the general costs
of the application under section 90.
5
The central thrust of the defendant’s application in the present proceedings is simple: The
plaintiff had clearly failed to comply with the requirements of r 13, in particular r 13(1). She had in
fact sought to remedy this by attempting to furnish security for costs after the timelines stipulated in
r 13(1). However, so the defendant’s argument went, the timelines were strict, indeed mandatory.
Hence, it (the defendant) was entitled (pursuant to the express language of r 13(4)) to take out the
present application for an order directing the dismissal of the plaintiff’s application under s 90 of the
Act and for the payment of its costs.
6
I now proceed to deal with the various issues raised by the parties.
Chambers or open court?
7
Counsel for the plaintiff, Mr M Ravi, argued strenuously that these proceedings ought not to
be heard in chambers, but, rather, in open court. The main plank of his argument was that it was in
the public interest that such proceedings be heard in open court. He also sought to argue for a more
general rule to this effect. I have no hesitation in rejecting this last-mentioned argument. There can
be no universal or all-encompassing rule to this effect. The facts and context of each set of
proceedings will differ from case to case and the procedure in this regard cannot therefore be writ in
stone. Indeed, the presumption in proceedings such as those in the present case is for a hearing in
chambers unless special reasons can be shown.
8
Nevertheless, in view of the close linkage between this particular application and the
plaintiff’s substantive application (the latter of which is in fact scheduled to be heard in open court), I
ruled that there was a sufficient public interest element to justify holding the hearing of these
proceedings in open court. But this, as I have mentioned, sets no precedent for the future. Nor, as I
have mentioned, is it wise to even attempt to set such a precedent.
The scope of the present application