justice and fairness. In the circumstances, to accede to the plaintiff’s request in the present proceedings would, in effect, be to commit two related errors simultaneously, ie, blatantly ignoring a mandatory rule out of a misguided sense of sympathy. 116 I should add that adherence to the law is the essence of the rule of law, which centres on objectivity as opposed to arbitrary subjective feelings (in this particular instance, of misguided sympathy). And respect for the law is not merely a practical necessity; it is an ideal without which arbitrariness will rear its ugly head. Merely dressing such arbitrariness up in various labels without more is to be eschewed, for labels without substance constitute not only empty rhetoric but also exceedingly dangerous things indeed – and all the more so when they have a superficial attractiveness, and nothing more. The exercise, as well as the ideal, of freedom are legitimate and real only when they are effected in accordance with the legal rules concerned. And it bears emphasising once again that the legal rule that is the focus of the present proceedings is undergirded by a clear rationale that constitutes its underlying spirit of justice and fairness. This meets – indeed roundly refutes – the charge of technicality as well as legalism or positivism which was a major plank in the plaintiff’s case in the present proceedings. 117 It is also axiomatic, commonsensical as well as just and fair that there cannot be a claim by a party for the vindication of legal rights without that party simultaneously fulfilling his or her legal responsibilities. In other words, one cannot claim one’s legal rights without fulfilling one’s legal responsibilities. The rhetoric of rights is not a licence for the unilateral appropriation of advantages without legitimate reciprocation; indeed, such conduct would be the very antithesis of the ideal underlying the very concept of rights as legitimately conceived. As I have already mentioned, one of the plaintiff’s legal responsibilities when she was making her application – and a mandatory one at that – was to furnish the requisite security for costs stipulated under r 13. Indeed, there was an additional grace period of three days as well. Notwithstanding this, she did not fulfil those responsibilities and the defendant was therefore justified (under r 13(4)) in taking out the present application. 118 Lest it be thought that such an approach is excessively harsh, even when taking into account the underlying spirit of justice and fairness referred to above, I would only state that the Act and the PER are themselves neutral in nature inasmuch as they could be relied upon by any party so long as that party could bring himself or herself within the ambit and spirit of the rule(s) concerned. Indeed, in so far as a breach of r 13 was concerned, had the shoe been on the other foot, so to speak, the option would have lain with the present plaintiff to have made precisely the same application taken out by the present defendant in the present proceedings. In other words, if the present plaintiff had been the defendant instead, and a similar situation had arisen, it would have clearly been open to her to apply under r 13(4) for the application against her to be dismissed. When posed with this hypothetical situation, Mr Ravi really had no answer, save for a half-hearted response to the effect that he would not have advocated such an application. But, surely, this is beside the point. As is obvious from r 13(4) itself as well as the case law (see generally, and respectively, [77]–[80] and [31]–[34] above), the option is of course with the defendant. But that does not – and cannot – detract (in any way) from the fact that a breach of r 13 entitles the defendant concerned to take out an application to dismiss the plaintiff’s application. 119 In the circumstances, I grant an order in terms of prayers (1) and (2) of the present application. The costs of the present application, granted to the defendant under prayer (2), are to be taxed. It follows that the plaintiff’s application in Originating Summons No 1017 of 2006 is also dismissed with the costs of that application also to be taxed. C opyright © Government of Singapore.