Page: 11 Issue 2: If the answer to Issue (1) is in the affirmative, does the infringement constitute a reasonable limit within the meaning of s 1 of the Charter? [61] Given my conclusion that neither the Signature Requirement Provision of the Act nor the Witness Requirement Provision of the Act breaches s 3 of the Charter, the outstanding inquiry is whether or not the Respondent can justify the infringement created by the Deposit Requirement Provision of the Act, which I have found to constitute a breach of this s 3 right. Applicant’s Position [62] The Applicant argues that the Charter breach created by the impugned Deposit Requirement Provision of the Act cannot be reasonably or demonstrably justified. He relies on the decision of the Supreme Court in R v Oakes, [1986] 1 SCR 103, 26 DLR (4th) 200, and asks this Court to apply the two-part inquiry prescribed in the case, wherein the government bears the burden of proving that the infringement is nonetheless valid under s 1 of the Charter. [63] The Applicant argues that the alleged objective of the Deposit Requirement Provision of the Act, which is to deter frivolous candidates, is not a constitutionally valid one. He then posits multiple questions that might potentially define frivolity, but indicates that there currently is no clear definition. As well, there is insufficient evidence to show how a particular kind of candidate would impair the integrity of the electoral process. He argues that there are no realworld examples of frivolous candidates threatening the integrity of the electoral system. By way of illustration, the Applicant cites the Rhinoceros Party and their deliberately non-serious political messaging. He notes that the Party presented 27 candidates in the most recent federal election, and apparently caused no harm to the integrity of electoral process. In effect, he submits, a test of seriousness of intention should not limit whether a citizen exercises their fundamental Charter rights: Sauvé v Canada (Chief Electoral Officer), 2002 SCC 68 at paras 43-44, [2002] 3 SCR 519. [64] Even if the objective of deterring frivolous candidates is a pressing and substantial one, the Applicant maintains that the deposit requirement cannot be said to be rationally connected to that objective. The requirement is over-inclusive – in the sense that serious candidates with limited financial means will be deterred; and the requirement is also under-inclusive – given that frivolous candidates with sufficient financial means will not be deterred from running. [65] The Applicant submits that the deposit of $1000 does not guarantee compliance with the remaining rules of the Act that relate to finances. He argues that providing the required $1000 deposit is only a test of a potential candidate’s ability to deposit $1000, not a test of the candidate’s intention or ability to follow the law regarding tax receipts for donations or any other requirement. In this context, the Applicant submits that given specific provisions in the Act that provides for significant punishment for noncompliance – including fines that are far more than the thousand dollars – the Respondent’s position that the deposit requirement is also there to 2017 ABQB 645 (CanLII) [60] Accordingly, I find that the Deposit Requirement Provision of the Act constitutes a measurably significant restriction on the right to play a meaningful role in the electoral process, and as such, breaches s 3 of the Charter.