Page: 12 [66] Finally, the Applicant submits that there are alternative legislative means available that would significantly less impair the rights of the potential candidate than the impugned Deposit Requirement Provision of the Act. As such, the deleterious effects are outweighed by any benefit that the impugned deposit provision might achieve. Respondent’s Position [67] The Respondent relies on the Lortie Report that emphasized the deposit requirement met the primary pressing and substantial objective to encourage the candidates’ compliance with the Act, and requiring potential candidates to take the elections process seriously. Thus, the requirement deters non-serious candidates. [68] The Respondent also outlines several previous cases that have considered the deposit requirement. Specifically, the Crown relies on Shebib v Canada, 2016 FC 539. In the case, when the plaintiff (Shebib) presented himself to the returning officer for the federal electoral district of Victoria in British Columbia, he “was accompanied by an ‘agent’ but did not have an auditor as required to be appointed, nor did he have the names, addresses and signatures of at least 100 persons entitled to vote in the riding, nor did he pay or offer to pay a deposit of $1000 or any other amount” as required by the federal legislation: Ibid at para 4. Consequently, Shebib’s nominating papers were refused. [69] One of the reliefs sought by the plaintiffs in Shebib was for: [L]eave to challenge the Canada Election Act governing the 2015 election. The [Plaintiffs] have freedom of speech and no requirement for money can be made of them without compromising that freedom. The Plaintiffs believe that this election is false and that we were denied our constitutional rights and that our lives are now threatened by a governing system that has excluded us from our free say. [70] Hughes J, found that: (i)” the Plaintiffs have not specifically invoked the Charter of Rights and Freedoms in their Amended Statement of Claim”; (ii) the Plaintiffs [have] not pleaded that they have any particular individual beliefs or thoughts that they say would preclude them from complying with the requirements of the Canada Elections Act, nor have they pleaded that it is impossible for them to do so”; and (iii) the Plaintiffs have not pleaded that the limitations respecting an auditor, or payment of money [or] 100 signatures present unreasonable limitations nor is it self-evident that they do so”: paras 21, 27, 29. Based on the reasoning that the plaintiffs in Shebib have not pled the material facts necessary to support a Charter argument, the Federal Court struck the plaintiffs’ statement of claim, and concluded that, “to the extent that the Amended Statement of Claim can be understood to allege breach of Charter rights, it fails to set out a proper cause of action and must be struck out”: Ibid at para 30. [71] The Respondent notes prior cases have cited social science sources, and that de Jong and Figueroa both relied on this pressing and substantial objective. It draws the Court’s attention to the fact that since Figueroa, the deposit made by candidates is now fully refundable. This is a significant difference from the main focus of the decision by Molloy J – which was that the prospective candidate might well lose some of their deposit depending solely on the number of 2017 ABQB 645 (CanLII) motivate compliance with the Act is unsustainable. Accordingly, the Applicant argues, this alleged objective of the deposit requirement is not rationally connected to the goal of protecting the integrity of the electoral finance regime.