26 LOUISIANA v. CALLAIS Opinion of the Court has had every incentive to produce such an alternative map”); see also Allen, 599 U. S., at 23 (observing that “modern computer technology” allows challengers to “generate millions of possible districting maps for a given State”). But if a §2 plaintiff cannot disentangle race from the State’s race-neutral considerations, including politics, then §2 cannot impose liability. In short, §2 imposes liability only when the evidence supports a strong inference that the State intentionally drew its districts to afford minority voters less opportunity because of their race. Not only does this interpretation follow from the plain text of §2, but it is consistent with the limited authority that the Fifteenth Amendment confers. C This interpretation of §2 does not require abandonment of the Gingles framework. We need only update the framework so it aligns with the statutory text and reflects important developments since we decided Gingles 40 years ago. Four historical developments are of particular note. First, vast social change has occurred throughout the country and particularly in the South, where many §2 suits arise. As this Court has recognized, “things have changed dramatically” in the decades since the passage of the Voting Rights Act. Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U. S. 529, 547 (2013). At the time of the Act’s passage, the Nation had faced nearly a century of “entrenched racial discrimination in voting, ‘an insidious and pervasive evil which had been perpetuated in certain parts of our country through unremitting and ingenious defiance of the Constitution.’ ” Id., at 535 (quoting Katzenbach, 383 U. S., at 309). But the Voting Rights Act led to “great strides” in the ensuing decades: “voting tests were abolished, disparities in voter registration and turnout due to race were erased, and AfricanAmericans attained political office in record numbers.” 570 U. S., at 549, 553. By 2004, the racial gap in voter