20 C How does McConnell affect the above principles governing non-profits? McConnell upheld congressionally imposed limits on political parties receiving or spending soft money. Some have argued that the Government can similarly restrict soft-money contributions to and spending by nonprofits. In this case, the District Court accepted that reasoning in ruling for the FEC; it found non-profits similarly situated to political parties for purposes of the First Amendment analysis. In our judgment, however, McConnell does not support such regulation of non-profits. McConnell affirmed BCRA’s limits on contributions to political parties because of the close ties between candidates and parties and the extensive record evidence of what it deemed a threat of actual or apparent corruption – specifically, the access to federal officials and candidates that large soft-money contributors to political parties received in exchange for their contributions. The Court said that it was “not unwarranted for Congress to conclude that the selling of access gives rise to the appearance of corruption.” McConnell, 540 U.S. at 154. The Court expressly based its conclusion on the “close relationship between federal officeholders and the national parties, as well as the means by which parties have traded on that relationship . . . .” Id.12 12 See generally McConnell, 540 U.S. at 130 (“both parties promised and provided special access to candidates and senior Government officials in exchange for large soft-money contributions”); id. at 145 (“special relationship and unity of interest” that candidates and officeholders share with parties); id. at 146 (“The evidence in the record shows that candidates and donors alike have in fact exploited the soft-money loophole, the former to increase their prospects of election and the latter to create debt on the part of officeholders, with the national parties serving as willing