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advertisement or communication refers to a state candidate as
well as a federal candidate, the non-profit must pay for it with
a percentage of its hard-money account as determined by time
and space allocation. See id. § 106.6(f)(3). Here again, the
problem is that non-profits are constitutionally entitled to pay
100% of the costs of their advertisements and other
communications out of a soft-money account. See MCFL,
479 U.S. at 251; NCPAC, 470 U.S. at 501; Citizens Against
Rent Control, 454 U.S. at 299; Cal-Med, 453 U.S. at 203
(opinion of Blackmun, J.); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 45-48.
Fifth, the regulations create a new regime for solicitations
indicating that donated funds will be used to support or
oppose the election of a clearly identified federal candidate.
11 C.F.R. § 100.57. The regulations require that donations in
response to such solicitations be treated as 100% hard money.
Id. § 100.57(a)-(b)(1). This means that donations in response
to such solicitations are subject to a $5000 cap. If a
solicitation also refers to a state or local candidate, at least
50% of the responsive donations must go to the hard-money
account. Id. § 100.57(b)(2). This provision is badly flawed.
Non-profits are entitled to raise money for their soft-money
accounts to help support their preferred candidates, yet this
regulation prohibits non-profits from saying as much in their
solicitations. “Such notions run afoul of the fundamental rule
of protection under the First Amendment, that a speaker has
the autonomy to choose the content of his own message.”
WRTL, 551 U.S. at 477 n.9 (internal quotation marks
omitted); Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 2771 (provision that requires
choice between “unfettered political speech” and
“discriminatory fundraising limitations” violates First
Amendment).