30
B
In short, the new FEC regulations do not pass muster
under the Supreme Court’s First Amendment precedents. The
regulations are not “closely drawn” to serve a cognizable anticorruption interest. See Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 2770-71; WRTL,
551 U.S. at 478-80; NCPAC, 470 U.S. at 496-97; Citizens
Against Rent Control, 454 U.S. at 296-97; Buckley, 424 U.S.
at 26-27, 45-48. Donations to and spending by a non-profit
cannot corrupt a candidate or officeholder, at least in the
absence of some McConnell-like evidence establishing such
corruption or the appearance thereof. See N.C. Right to Life,
Inc. v. Leake, 525 F.3d 274, 292-93 (4th Cir. 2008); see also
Richard Briffault, The 527 Problem and the Buckley
Problem, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 949, 999 (2005) (“The 527s
do not fit easily within Buckley’s anticorruption paradigm, at
least as the Supreme Court has defined corruption until
now.”); Gregg D. Polsky & Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Regulating
Section 527 Organizations, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1000,
1027-35 (2005).
Of course, the fact that the regulations do not serve a
cognizable anti-corruption interest is not surprising because
the decision to more tightly regulate entities like EMILY’s
List arose out of an entirely different concern: the influence of
non-profits that raise and spend large amounts of money and
thereby affect federal elections. See, e.g., Comments of
Democracy 21, Campaign Legal Center & Center for
Responsive Politics in Response to Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, No. 2004-6, at 1-2 (Apr. 5, 2004) (criticizing
“the spending of tens of millions of dollars of soft money
explicitly for the purpose of influencing the presidential
election by section 527 groups”). Responding to such
complaints, the FEC adopted these new regulations to tamp
down spending by non-profits and thereby better equalize the