30 B In short, the new FEC regulations do not pass muster under the Supreme Court’s First Amendment precedents. The regulations are not “closely drawn” to serve a cognizable anticorruption interest. See Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 2770-71; WRTL, 551 U.S. at 478-80; NCPAC, 470 U.S. at 496-97; Citizens Against Rent Control, 454 U.S. at 296-97; Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26-27, 45-48. Donations to and spending by a non-profit cannot corrupt a candidate or officeholder, at least in the absence of some McConnell-like evidence establishing such corruption or the appearance thereof. See N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake, 525 F.3d 274, 292-93 (4th Cir. 2008); see also Richard Briffault, The 527 Problem and the Buckley Problem, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 949, 999 (2005) (“The 527s do not fit easily within Buckley’s anticorruption paradigm, at least as the Supreme Court has defined corruption until now.”); Gregg D. Polsky & Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Regulating Section 527 Organizations, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1000, 1027-35 (2005). Of course, the fact that the regulations do not serve a cognizable anti-corruption interest is not surprising because the decision to more tightly regulate entities like EMILY’s List arose out of an entirely different concern: the influence of non-profits that raise and spend large amounts of money and thereby affect federal elections. See, e.g., Comments of Democracy 21, Campaign Legal Center & Center for Responsive Politics in Response to Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, No. 2004-6, at 1-2 (Apr. 5, 2004) (criticizing “the spending of tens of millions of dollars of soft money explicitly for the purpose of influencing the presidential election by section 527 groups”). Responding to such complaints, the FEC adopted these new regulations to tamp down spending by non-profits and thereby better equalize the

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