International Foundation for Electoral Systems elections ultimately were annulled over alleged irregularities in electronic results transmission and the process for final certification of results – an aspect of the electoral process that was more difficult for both citizen and international observer groups to observe.60 Some international election observation organizations have published handbooks on how to observe technology in elections. These documents provide future observation teams with election technology standards and best practice guidelines. The consensus among these groups favors more technical skills for core teams, longer and earlier missions, and closer observation of election technology – including during the development of specifications and the procurement stage. The Carter Center’s Handbook on Observing Electronic Voting recommends having at least two members of a core observer team with technical skills, ideally with a combination of electoral experience and technological or computer science skills. These “e-voting experts” should have five to ten years of relevant experience.61 Core team members without a technical background need additional training to evaluate the technical aspects of the electoral process. The Organization of American States (OAS) recommends that a “core group” of technical staff and specialists, along with long-term observers, conduct an analysis of the technology to be used in the upcoming elections. The results should be used to determine the training needed for short-term observers.62 New technology requires extra preparation on the part of election observation missions (EOMs). According to The Carter Center, EOMs should start as early as possible, typically four to six months before an election, and stay until any dispute resolution has finished.63 NDI recommends observer involvement at every stage of the technological adoption process, including developing specifications for hardware and software, testing the technology, and reviewing training manuals and attending training sessions for EMB employees.64 The Carter Center, ODIHR and the OAS provide a questionnaire for observers monitoring new election technology; the OSCE has a checklist of questions in their Handbook for the Observation of New Voting Technologies.65 This demonstrates that observer groups are adapting to the new requirements that election technology presents, although funding and resources can be a challenge in supporting longer-term and more technical observation. Apart from direct observation of key events, such as for example tabulation of election results as well as interviews with EMBs, election observers should be equipped to evaluate and report on testing and auditing, and certification, if any, of any election process that involves new technology. 60 Julia Brothers, “Using Open Data to Verify Information in Elections,” NDI, March 2018, https://www.demworks.org/using-open-data-verify-information-elections. 61 The Carter Center, Observing Electronic Voting, (Georgia: 2012), 5. 62 Gustavo Aldana, et al., Observing the Use of Electoral Technologies: A Manual for OAS Electoral Observation Missions, OAS, 8. 63 The Carter Center, Observing Electronic Voting, 2012, 6-7. 64 Vladimir Pran and Patrick Merloe, Monitoring Electronic Technologies in Electoral Processes, NDI, (Washington, DC: 2007), 35-41. 65 The Carter Center, Observing Electronic Voting, 2012, 41-65; Aldana, et al., Observing the Use of Electoral Technologies: A Manual for OAS Electoral Observation Missions, 33-35; OSCE, Handbook for the Observation of New Voting Technologies, (Warsaw, Poland: 2013), 70-71. 14