16
ALEXANDER v. SOUTH CAROLINA STATE CONFERENCE
OF THE NAACP
Opinion of the Court
goal. And certainly nothing rules out that possibility. In
light of the presumption of legislative good faith, that possibility is dispositive.
The District Court’s reasoning, however, is flatly inconsistent with that presumption. And what the court did—
inferring bad faith based on the racial effects of a political
gerrymander in a jurisdiction in which race and partisan
preference are very closely correlated—would, if accepted,
provide a convenient way for future litigants and lower
courts to sidestep our holding in Rucho that partisangerrymandering claims are not justiciable in federal court.
Under the District Court’s reasoning, a litigant could repackage a partisan-gerrymandering claim as a racialgerrymandering claim by exploiting the tight link between
race and political preference. Instead of claiming that a
State impermissibly set a target Republican-Democratic
breakdown, a plaintiff could simply reverse-engineer the
partisan data into racial data and argue that the State impermissibly set a particular BVAP target. Our decisions
cannot be evaded with such ease. For that reason, the District Court clearly erred in finding that the legislature deliberately sought to maintain a particular BVAP just because the maps that produced the sought-after partisan
goal all had roughly the same BVAP.
Second, the District Court inferred a racial motive from
certain changes that the State made in redrawing District
1, namely, the Enacted Plan moved more voters out of District 1 (approximately 140,000) than were needed to comply
with the one person, one vote rule (about 88,000), and the
Enacted Plan split Charleston and a few other counties
even though the avoidance of such splits is a traditional redistricting objective. But here, again, the State’s avowed
partisan objective easily explains these facts. The State
claims it sought to ensure that District 1 had a reliable Republican majority, and simply removing 88,000 voters with-