24 ABBOTT v. PEREZ Opinion of the Court The dissent labors to explain away all these references to the 2013’s Legislature’s supposed duty to purge its predecessor’s allegedly discriminatory intent, but the dissent loses track of its own argument and characterizes the District Court’s reasoning exactly as we have. Indeed, the dissent criticizes us on page 33 of its opinion for saying precisely the same thing that it said 11 pages earlier. On page 33, the dissent states: “[T]he majority quotes the orders as requiring proof that the Legislature “ ‘engage[d] in a deliberative process to ensure that the 2013 plans cured any taint from the 2011 plans.’ ” But the District Court did not put the burden on Texas to make that affirmative showing.” Post, at 33 (quoting supra, at 23, in turn quoting 274 F. Supp. 3d, at 649; citations omitted). But earlier, the dissent itself describes the District Court’s analysis as follows: “Despite knowing of the discrimination in its 2011 maps, ‘the Legislature did not engage in a deliberative process to ensure that the 2013 plans cured any taint from the 2011 plans.’ ” Post, at 22 (quoting 274 F. Supp. 3d, at 649). And this is not just a single slip of the pen. The dissent writes that the District Court was required “to assess how —————— the last part of this sentence, in which the District Court stated that the Legislature “intended [the] taint to be maintained but safe from remedy.” Post, at 33–34. In making this argument, the dissent, like the District Court, refuses to heed the presumption of legislative good faith and the allocation of the burden of proving intentional discrimination. We do not dispute that the District Court purportedly found that the 2013 Legislature acted with discriminatory intent. The problem is that, in making that finding, it relied overwhelmingly on what it perceived to be the 2013 Legislature’s duty to show that it had purged the bad intent of its predecessor.