Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018) 25 Opinion of the Court the 2013 Legislature addressed the known discrimination that motivated” the districts approved by that Court in 2012. Post, at 31. The dissent quotes the District Court’s statement that “ ‘there is no indication that the Legislature looked to see whether any discriminatory taint remained in the plans.’ ” Post, at 23 (quoting 274 F. Supp. 3d, at 649). And there is also this: “Texas was just ‘not truly interested in fixing any remaining discrimination in [its 2011 maps].’ ” Post, at 22 (quoting 274 F. Supp. 3d, at 651, n. 45). The District Court’s true mode of analysis is so obvious that the dissent cannot help but repeat it. And that approach was fundamentally flawed and demands reversal. While a district court’s finding of fact on the question of discriminatory intent is reviewed for clear error, see Cromartie, 532 U. S., at 242, whether the court applied the correct burden of proof is a question of law subject to plenary review, U. S. Bank N. A. v. Village at Lakeridge, LLC, 583 U. S. ___, ___ (2018) (slip op., at 5); Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Management System, Inc., 572 U. S. ___, ___ (2014) (slip op., at 4). And when a finding of fact is based on the application of an incorrect burden of proof, the finding cannot stand. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U. S. 485, 501 (1984) (“An appellate cour[t has] power to correct errors of law, including those that . . . infect . . . a finding of fact that is predicated on a misunderstanding of the governing rule of law”). B In holding that the District Court disregarded the presumption of legislative good faith and improperly reversed the burden of proof, we do not suggest either that the intent of the 2011 Legislature is irrelevant or that the plans enacted in 2013 are unassailable because they were previously adopted on an interim basis by the Texas court. Rather, both the intent of the 2011 Legislature and the