replace him with another.69 Likewise, in Schulz v. Williams, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found competitive standing where the Conservative party alleged an injury in fact by arguing that a candidate from the Libertarian Party of New York was improperly placed on the ballot for the Governor’s race in 1994.70 By way of yet another example, Plaintiffs’ citation to Fulani v. Hogsett makes the same point; competitive standing applies to challenges regarding the eligibility of a candidate. There, the Indiana Secretary of State was required to certify the names of candidates for President by a certain date.71 When the Secretary failed to certify the Democratic and Republican candidates by that date, the New Alliance party challenged the inclusion of those candidates on the ballot, arguing that allowing these ineligible candidates constituted an injury-infact.72 Three other cases relied on by Plaintiffs illustrate separate grounds for stating an injury in fact, all still relating to ballot provisions.73 It is telling that the only case from the Third Circuit cited to by Plaintiffs, Marks v. Stinson, does not contain a discussion of competitive standing or any other theory of standing applicable in federal court.74 Simply pointing to another 69 70 71 72 73 74 459 F.3d at 586. 44 F.3d 48, 53 (2d Cir. 1994). 917 F.2d 1028, 1029-30 (7th Cir. 1990). Id. See Green Party of Tennessee v. Hargett, 767 F.3d 533, 542-43 (6th Cir. 2014) (finding that Plaintiffs had standing to challenge Tennessee’s ballot-access laws); see also Pavek v. Donald J. Trump for President, Inc., 967 F.3d 905, 907 (8th Cir. 2020) (finding that Plaintiffs had standing to challenge the ballot-ordering provision in Minnesota); Nelson v. Warner, No. 3:19-0898, 2020 WL 4582414, at *3 (S.D. W. Va. Aug. 10, 2020) (same). 19 F.3d 873 (3d Cir. 1994). - 22 -