case where a competitor in an election was found to have standing does not establish competitive standing in this matter. Without more, this Court declines to take such an expansive view of the theory of competitive standing, particularly given the abundance of guidance from other Circuits, based on Plaintiffs’ own citations, limiting the use of this doctrine. The Trump Campaign has not offered another theory of standing, and therefore, cannot meet its burden of establishing Article III jurisdiction. To be clear, this Court is not holding that a political campaign can never establish standing to challenge the outcome of an election; rather, it merely finds that in this case, the Trump Campaign has not pled a cognizable theory.75 IV. MOTION TO DISMISS 12(b)(6) A. Legal Standard Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court dismisses a complaint, in whole or in part, if the plaintiff has failed to “state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” A motion to dismiss “tests the legal sufficiency of a claim”76 and “streamlines litigation by dispensing with needless discovery and factfinding.”77 “Rule 12(b)(6) authorizes a court to dismiss a claim on the basis of 75 76 77 Even assuming, however, that the Trump Campaign could establish that element of standing, it would still fail to satisfy the causation and redressability requirements for the same reasons that the Voter Plaintiffs do. To the extent the Trump Campaign alleges any injury at all, its injury is attenuated from the actions challenged. Richardson v. Bledsoe, 829 F.3d 273, 289 n. 13 (3d Cir. 2016) (Smith, C.J.) (citing Szabo v. Bridgeport Machines, Inc., 249 F.3d 672, 676 (7th Cir. 2001) (Easterbrook, J.)). Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326-27 (1989). - 23 -