16 FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N v. TED CRUZ FOR SENATE
Opinion of the Court
States that did not impose aggregate limits on individual
contributions).
The Government instead puts forward a handful of media
reports and anecdotes that it says illustrate the special
risks associated with repaying candidate loans after an
election. But as the District Court found, those reports
“merely hypothesize that individuals who contribute after
the election to help retire a candidate’s debt might have
greater influence with or access to the candidate.” 542
F. Supp. 3d, at 15. That is not the type of quid pro quo corruption the Government may target consistent with the
First Amendment. See McCutcheon, 572 U. S., at 207–208.
The dissent at points shrugs off this distinction, see post,
at 2, 12, n. 3, 13, but our cases make clear that “the Government may not seek to limit the appearance of mere influence or access.” McCutcheon, 572 U. S., at 208. As we
have explained, influence and access “embody a central feature of democracy—that constituents support candidates
who share their beliefs and interests, and candidates who
are elected can be expected to be responsive to those concerns.” Id., at 192.
To be sure, the “line between quid pro quo corruption and
general influence may seem vague at times, but the distinction must be respected in order to safeguard basic First
Amendment rights.” Id., at 209. And in drawing that line,
“the First Amendment requires us to err on the side of protecting political speech rather than suppressing it.” Ibid.
(quoting Wisconsin Right to Life, 551 U. S., at 457 (opinion
of ROBERTS, C. J.)).
2
In the absence of direct evidence, the Government turns
elsewhere. It contends that a scholarly article, a poll, and
statements by Members of Congress show that these contributions carry a heightened risk of at least the appear-