24 NATIONAL REPUBLICAN SENATORIAL COMMITTEE v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N Opinion of the Court must be “necessary” and “narrowly tailored” to the asserted interest. See McCutcheon v. Federal Election Comm’n, 572 U. S. 185, 199, 218, 220 (2014) (quotation marks omitted); Federal Election Comm’n v. Ted Cruz for Senate, 596 U. S. 289, 306 (2022). The Court, moreover, has repudiated the undue influence rationale relied on in Colorado II. See McCutcheon, 572 U. S., at 207–208. And after Colorado II, this Court has identified earmarking and disclosure laws as sufficient to prevent circumvention. See 572 U. S., at 221–224. Still further, Colorado II’s description of the relationship between political parties and candidates has not held up. Colorado II stated that parties are not “in a unique position” to candidates. 533 U. S., at 455. But as the Court subsequently recognized, only parties “select slates of candidates,” and “party affiliation is the primary way by which voters identify candidates.” McConnell v. Federal Election Comm’n, 540 U. S. 93, 188 (2003). Political parties therefore do occupy a unique position with “a special relationship and unity of interest” with candidates. Id., at 145. Turning to the effects of Colorado II: That decision rested in part on an apparent concern that political parties otherwise could exercise outsized influence in political campaigns and elections—in particular that parties “act as agents for spending on behalf of those who seek to produce obligated officeholders.” 533 U. S., at 452. Colorado II opined that “parties’ capacity to concentrate power to elect is the very capacity that apparently opens them to exploitation as channels for circumventing contribution and coordinated spending limits binding on other political players.” Id., at 455. But since 2001, political parties’ relative power has substantially diminished in comparison to outside groups. Colorado II contributed in part to that shift: The politicalparty coordinated-expenditure limits impose a “stifling