Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) 25 Opinion of the Court effect on the ability of the party to do what it exists to do.” Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election Comm’n, 518 U. S. 604, 630 (1996) (Colorado I) (opinion of Kennedy, J.); see R. Pildes, Romanticizing Democracy, Political Fragmentation, and the Decline of American Government, 124 Yale L. J. 804, 838–839 (2014). Meanwhile, donors can and do send their funds to Super PACs and other outside groups that have a First Amendment right to receive and spend unlimited money to support their independent political speech. See SpeechNow.org v. Federal Election Comm’n, 599 F. 3d 686 (CADC 2010) (en banc); see also Emily’s List v. Federal Election Comm’n, 581 F. 3d 1 (CADC 2009). In the 2024 election cycle, PACs raised over $15.7 billion, as compared to $2.7 billion by political parties. Federal Election Comm’n, Statistical Summary of 24-Month Campaign Activity of the 2023–2024 Election Cycle Press Release (Apr. 23, 2025). To uphold the political-party coordinated-expenditure limits here could therefore help consign political parties to continued second-tier status as compared to outside groups. Weakened political parties distort the political system. And in the views of many, the relatively diminished political parties have ushered in increased political polarization and fragmentation. For that reason, many who generally support campaign finance restrictions have called for elimination of the political-party coordinated-expenditure limits. See R. Pildes & B. Bauer, Election Law Blog: The Supreme Court, the Political Parties, and the SuperPacs (June 24, 2025) (“[E]ven many in the political reform community support an end to the limits” on political-party coordinated expenditures). Finally as to reliance: The reliance of outside groups on a precedent that has helped them gain an unwarranted and unfair advantage over competitor political parties in the political process is not the kind of reliance interest that