Wong Souk Yee v AG [2019] SGCA 25 make provision” for, among other things, any constituency to be declared and then contested as a GRC. On this view, Art 49(1) would not have any application to GRCs at all. (c) Third, Parliament intended that Art 49(1) would apply to GRCs, but was satisfied that the phrase “in the manner provided by or under any law relating to Parliamentary elections” would sufficiently incorporate the reference to s 24(2A) of the PEA so as to qualify the operation of Art 49(1) in this context. 55 Having considered the extraneous material, we could not discern with any degree of certainty which of these three possibilities was clearly to be preferred; and the Deputy Attorney-General, who appeared for the Respondent, also conceded before us that there was nothing in the relevant parliamentary debates that would shed light on this. 56 There is an important distinction between the first possibility and the second and third possibilities set out at [54] above. The first possibility suggests that Parliament intended to amend the Constitution but inadvertently omitted to do so; whereas the other two possibilities suggest that Parliament did not intend to amend Art 49(1) because it considered that the language of that provision, or, alternatively, that of Art 39A, was sufficient to achieve its intended outcome by incorporating the necessary reference to the explicit language in s 24(2A) of the PEA. Flowing from this distinction are two points that have a significant bearing on the question of how we should give effect to Parliament’s intention in the light of the available extraneous material. First, if there is a reasonable possibility that Parliament did not intend to amend a particular statutory provision to put an intended outcome into practice, this raises the question of whether it is permissible for us to read in such an amendment. It was suggested 23