Wong Souk Yee v AG [2019] SGCA 25 to us, on behalf of the Respondent, that we could do so by adopting what has been referred to as a rectifying construction. We consider this further below, but observe that questions may fairly be raised as to whether this is even an available avenue when the statutory provision in question is not ordinary legislation but the Constitution itself. Second, there may well be a difference in the practical outcome of the matter, depending on which possibility is chosen. As highlighted by the Deputy Attorney-General, interpreting Art 49(1) in a manner which is consistent with the third possibility at [54] above would hypothetically allow a simple majority in Parliament to denude a constitutional provision (in this case, Art 49(1)) of its effect. As an illustration, this could result if Parliament were to amend s 24(2A) of the PEA to state that “No writ shall be issued for an election to fill a vacancy in the seat of a Member”. This seems implausible since it would enable Parliament to act contrary to the limits imposed by the Constitution without first amending it. Having regard to the principle of constitutional supremacy that is enshrined in Art 4, we do not think it would be permissible to construe Art 49(1) as if it allowed Parliament, in effect, to act contrary to the limitations on Parliament that are contained in and imposed by the Constitution. 57 With these preliminary observations, we turn to address the proper meaning that should be placed on Art 49(1) in the light of the extraneous material. The proper interpretation of Art 49(1) in the light of the extraneous material 58 To recapitulate, there are three possible interpretations of Art 49(1) in the context of a vacancy arising in a single seat in a GRC (see [47] above): (a) the vacancy, as and when it arises, shall be filled by a by-election for all the seats in the GRC (“the Appellant’s Interpretation”); 24