MAGYAR KÉTFARKÚ KUTYA PÁRT v. HUNGARY JUDGMENT 35 § 31, Series A no. 298, and Bédat v. Switzerland [GC], no. 56925/08, § 58, 29 March 2016). The MKKP’s conduct falls into this category. 91. In the Court’s view, in the circumstances of this case, the two aspects – providing a forum for third-party content and imparting information and ideas itself – are inseparably intertwined. The Court accepts that providing voters with a mobile application and calling on them to upload and publish photographs of ballot papers, and encouraging them to cast an invalid ballot, thus involved the exercise of the MKKP’s right to freedom of expression in relation to both aspects. 92. The authorities’ reaction to the MKKP’s exercise of its rights under Article 10 of the Convention amounted to interference with those rights. 2. Whether the interference was prescribed by law (a) General principles 93. The Court reiterates that the expression “prescribed by law” in the second paragraph of Article 10 not only requires that the impugned measure should have a legal basis in domestic law, but also refers to the quality of the law in question, which should be accessible to the person concerned and foreseeable as to its effects (see, amongst many other authorities, Delfi AS v. Estonia [GC], no. 64569/09, § 120, ECHR 2015, with further references). The notion of “quality of the law” requires, as a corollary of the foreseeability test, that the law be compatible with the rule of law; it thus implies that there must be adequate safeguards in domestic law against arbitrary interferences by public authorities (see Malone v. the United Kingdom, 2 August 1984, § 67, Series A no. 82, and Olsson v. Sweden (no. 1), 24 March 1988, § 61, Series A no. 130). 94. As regards the requirement of foreseeability, the Court has repeatedly held that a norm cannot be regarded as a “law” within the meaning of Article 10 § 2 unless it is formulated with sufficient precision to enable a person to regulate his or her conduct. That person must be able – if need be with appropriate advice – to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences which a given action may entail. Those consequences need not be foreseeable with absolute certainty. Whilst certainty is desirable, it may bring in its train excessive rigidity, and the law must be able to keep pace with changing circumstances. Accordingly, many laws are inevitably couched in terms which, to a greater or lesser extent, are vague, and whose interpretation and application are questions of practice (see further Delfi AS, cited above, § 121, and Centro Europa 7 S.r.l. and Di Stefano v. Italy [GC], no. 38433/09, § 141, ECHR 2012). The criterion of foreseeability cannot be interpreted as requiring that all detailed conditions and procedures governing the interference be laid down in the substantive law itself, the requirements of “lawfulness” can be met if points which cannot be satisfactorily resolved on the basis of substantive law are set out