36 MAGYAR KÉTFARKÚ KUTYA PÁRT v. HUNGARY JUDGMENT in enactments of lower rank than statutes (see Association Ekin v. France, no. 39288/98, § 46, ECHR 2001-VIII). A law which confers a discretion is thus not in itself inconsistent with the requirement of foreseeability, provided that the scope of the discretion and the manner of its exercise are indicated with sufficient clarity, having regard to the legitimate aim of the measure in question, to give the individual adequate protection against arbitrary interference (see Gillow v. the United Kingdom, 24 November 1986, § 51, Series A no. 109). 95. That said, it is not for the Court to express a view on the appropriateness of the methods chosen by the legislature of a respondent State to regulate a given field. Its task is confined to determining whether the methods adopted and the effects they entail are in conformity with the Convention (see Magyar Helsinki Bizottság v. Hungary [GC], no. 18030/11, § 184, 8 November 2016). 96. The Court would also reiterate that in proceedings originating in an individual application under Article 34 of the Convention, its task is not to review domestic law in the abstract but to determine whether the way in which it was applied to the applicant gave rise to a breach of the Convention (see Perinçek v. Switzerland [GC], no. 27510/08, § 136, ECHR 2015 (extracts), with further references). 97. Moreover, a margin of doubt in relation to borderline facts does not by itself make a legal provision unforeseeable in its application. Nor does the mere fact that a provision is capable of more than one construction mean that it fails to meet the requirement of “foreseeability” for the purposes of the Convention. The role of adjudication vested in the courts is precisely to dissipate such interpretational doubts as remain, taking into account the changes in everyday practice (see Gorzelik and Others v. Poland [GC], no. 44158/98, § 65, ECHR 2004-I). At the same time, the Court is aware that there must come a day when a given legal norm is applied for the first time (see, mutatis mutandis, Kudrevičius and Others v. Lithuania [GC], no. 37553/05, § 115, ECHR 2015). 98. As regards the scope of the notion of foreseeability, it depends to a considerable degree on the content of the instrument in question, the field it is designed to cover and the number and status of those to whom it is addressed (see, among many other authorities, Delfi AS, cited above, § 122, and Gorzelik and Others, cited above, § 65). 99. The electoral context takes on special significance in this regard, given the importance of the integrity of the voting process in preserving the confidence of the electorate in the democratic institutions. Accordingly, the Court has found wide and unpredictable interpretations of legal provisions governing elections to be either unforeseeable in their effects or indeed arbitrary and therefore incompatible with Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 (see Kovach v. Ukraine, no. 39424/02, §§ 48-62, ECHR 2008; Lykourezos v. Greece, no. 33554/03, §§ 50-58, ECHR 2006-VIII; and Paschalidis,