of politics” with only some “tweak[ing]” of the conversation for “her to understand some thing or to talk at a more fundamental level to make sure she understands before she . . . pulled that kind of lever.” Stating “I wasn’t even getting that from William[,]” the judge agreed that voting rights and supported decision-making statutes can co-exist, but ultimately concluded, “just not for William. I think he’s not the one.” The court subsequently entered an order denying William “the right to register to vote and to participate in the voting process[,]” stating that it found “by clear and convincing evidence that [he] lacks sufficient capacity to understand the voting process and/or to effectively communicate a desire to participate in the voting process, even with the help and guidance of supported decision-makers.” As written, Maryland’s disqualification statute applies when an otherwise qualified individual “is under guardianship for mental disability and a court . . . has specifically found by clear and convincing evidence that the individual cannot communicate, with or without accommodations, a desire to participate in the voting process[.]” EL § 3-102(b)(2). To that requirement, the circuit court erroneously engrafted an additional test that required William to establish a “base understanding” of politics. As the excerpted transcript shows, the court repeatedly indicated that it was disqualifying William because he did not demonstrate a “base level understanding of the political process, of why he’s voting for a particular person[.]” That is not the correct legal standard for determining whether William is disqualified from participating in the voting process. Compounding that error in applying the wrong legal standard, the court also erred or abused its discretion in denying William any “accommodations” to assist him in 27