communicating his “desire to participate in the voting process[.]” See EL § 3-102(b)(2). For example, as William took the stand in the courtroom, in circumstances that commonly induce anxiety for any witness about to be questioned under oath, the court expressly prohibited Parents from offering any assistance, including help that might have avoided the correction made by the judge when William raised the wrong hand to take his oath. We also note that after counsel for Parents elicited William’s affirmations that he wants to vote and talks about voting with Parents, William became unresponsive to the judge’s compound questions about why he wanted to vote. Once counsel resumed questioning, William testified affirmatively when asked whether he cares about who is leading the country and, without prompting, identified specific candidates, his favorite former president, and where the president lives. Based on this record, we cannot say that the denial of any and all accommodations to assist William in understanding and responding to questions had no impact on his testimony or on the court’s assessment of it. We discern nothing in the Election Law statute that would preclude Parents from offering reasonable help to William as an accommodation contemplated by the disqualification statute. To the extent the court misunderstood the statute to preclude such assistance, the court erred as a matter of law. To the extent the court applied the statute in refusing such assistance, the court abused its discretion in these circumstances. Because the court applied the incorrect legal standard and failed to permit reasonable accommodations to assist William in communicating his desire to vote, we must vacate the order denying William “the right to register to vote and to participate in the voting process[.]” We will remand for reconsideration of that disqualification question. 28