5.2. The court did not agree with the applicant’s position that § 51 of the REA, on which the precept was
based, contravened §§ 32, 45 and 60(2) of the Constitution. In this respect, the Administrative Court relied
on the Supreme Court en banc judgment of 1 July 2010 in case No 3-4-1-33-09 and noted that the applicant
had not indicated any circumstances that would give grounds to reach a different opinion than the Supreme
Court in the instant case.
6. In his appeal of 11 May 2016, A. Talvik sought a reversal of the Administrative Court judgment of 11
April 2016, satisfaction of his action, and an order for payment by the respondent of the applicant’s
procedural expenses.
6.1. In the opinion of A. Talvik, the Administrative Court judgment was contrary to para. 71 of the cited
Supreme Court judgment in which the Supreme Court did not rule out that the prohibition on outdoor
advertising may turn out to be unconstitutional in the frame of specific constitutional review.
6.2. The Administrative Court judgment was also contrary to the Supreme Court Criminal Chamber
judgment in case No 3-1-1-69-11. In that judgment the Court held that, insofar as the prohibition on political
outdoor advertising extends to items in a candidate’s personal possession, it interferes more than customarily
with privacy and the core of freedom of expression and the fundamental right to property, and could
therefore turn out to be unconstitutional. Even though guidelines given by the Supreme Court in other cases
are not legally binding on the administrative court, simply to ignore interpretations of the law expressed in
other cases without the court refuting them in substance is not justified.
7. The PBGB sought dismissal of the appeal and an order for the applicant to pay the procedural expenses.
7.1. The Supreme Court en banc has explained that prohibiting outdoor advertising during active
campaigning does not rule out introducing one’s views or programme via other channels. Thus, the
applicant’s right to property may be interfered with but the interference is proportional in the narrow sense
and necessary to attain the goal intended by the legislator.
7.2. In the opinion of the PBGB, the prohibition on political outdoor advertising is appropriate, necessary
and proportional in the narrow sense. The opinions expressed in the Supreme Court Criminal Chamber
judgment of 14 October 2011 in case No 3-1-1-69-11 are not relevant. The applicant failed to notice that in
that judgment the person subject to proceedings was charged with an offence committed in the course of a
campaign for a local council election. The Supreme Court clearly distinguished that election from the
election for the Riigikogu and for the European Parliament.
7.3. Personal possessions may include very large items, including means of transport. If outdoor advertising
were allowed for items in personal possession, a candidate could hire, for example, a double-decker bus,
cover it with advertising and park it in a busy area. In view of the fact that members of larger political parties
also have more financial resources, allowing outdoor advertising on items in personal possession would not
help smaller political parties but would, instead, present an opportunity for larger ones.
ORDER OF TALLINN COURT OF APPEAL
8. By judgment of 16 February 2017, Tallinn Court of Appeal reversed the Administrative Court judgment
of 11 April 2016. The Court of Appeal held that § 51 of the REA was unconstitutional insofar as it
prohibited political outdoor advertising on a car in personal use of a person running as a candidate on a
political party list during active campaigning. On that basis, the court annulled the unlawful precept of the
PBGB of 19 February 2015.
8.1. The Supreme Court en banc in case No 3-4-1-33-09 held that the prohibition on political outdoor
advertising laid down in § 51 of the REA interferes with the right to vote in connection with the election of a
representative body, the right to stand as a candidate in combination with freedom of expression, as well as
freedom of enterprise, the fundamental right to property, and freedom of activity by political parties. In