addition, the Court en banc held that the Constitution does not rule out restricting those fundamental rights
and freedoms for the following purposes:
1) reducing the role of money in gaining political power and ensuring the equality of political parties,
individual candidates and election coalitions by reducing election campaign costs;
2) increasing the role of political argumentation;
3) freeing public space of excessive outdoor advertising which may cause public resentment towards
political advertising and politics as a whole;
4) reducing improper influence on voters by means of influence used in outdoor advertising.
8.2. The Court en banc found that the prohibition on political outdoor advertising is appropriate, necessary
and proportional in the narrow sense for attaining the above goals. However, the Court en banc noted that
even though in abstract constitutional review proceedings the prohibition proved to be constitutional, this
does not rule out specific constitutional review.
8.3. The Supreme Court Criminal Chamber in its judgment in case No 3-1-1-69-11 held that based on the
circumstances of a specific case the prohibition on political outdoor advertising may prove to be
unconstitutional in certain aspects. The Chamber had misgivings as to whether the prohibition on political
outdoor advertising laid down in § 61 of the Municipal Council Election Act is also constitutional as a means
for attaining the goals indicated by the Court en banc to the extent that it deprives a person standing as a
candidate in local elections of the right to advertise their candidacy on items in their personal possession,
including a car or also, for example, clothes worn by the candidate.
8.4. By relying on the position expressed in the judgment of the Supreme Court Criminal Chamber cited
above, the Court of Appeal held that § 51 of the REA was unconstitutional insofar as it prohibited political
outdoor advertising on a car in the personal use of a person standing as a candidate on a political party list
during active campaigning because such a prohibition does not contribute to attaining the goals indicated in
the Supreme Court en banc judgment of 1 July 2010.
OPINIONS OF THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE PROCEEDINGS
9.-13. [not translated]
PROVISION DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL
14. Riigikogu Election Act, § 51 “Prohibition on political outdoor advertising”:
“Advertising of independent candidates, political parties or persons who stand as candidates in the list of a
political party, or their logo or other distinctive mark or programme on a building, civil engineering works,
inner or outer side of public transport vehicles or taxis, and other political outdoor advertising is prohibited
during the active campaigning.
[RT I 2005, 37, 281 - entered into force 10 July 2005]“
OPINION OF THE CHAMBER
15. The prohibition on political outdoor advertising derives from § 51 of the REA. The Supreme Court en
banc concluded in its judgment of 1 July 2010 in case No 3-4-1-33-09 that even though in abstract
constitutional review proceedings the prohibition on political outdoor advertising is constitutional, this does
not rule out specific constitutional review.
16. In constitutional review proceedings the Supreme Court, based on § 14(2) of the Constitutional Review