or the State legislature shall be called in question except by an election petition presented to such authority and in such manner as may be provided for by or under any law made by the appropriate Legislature. It was, therefore, open to the legislature to leave the adjudication of election disputes to authorities other than those in the hierarchy of our judicial system. In fact, until the passing of the Representation of the People (Amendment) Act. 47 of 1966, by which High Courts were given jurisdiction to try election petitions, that jurisdiction was vested first in a tribunal consisting of three members and later in a tribunal consisting of a single member who was to be a sitting District Judge. The decisions of those tribunals could eventually be brought before the Supreme Court under Article 136 (1) of the Constitution but it is at least plausible that were the Legislatures to pass laws leaving the decision of election disputes to themselves, judicial review might have stood excluded. Since the Constitution, as originally enacted, did not consider that judicial power must intervene in the interests of purity of elections, judicial review cannot be considered to be a part of the basic structure in so far as legislative elections are concerned. The theory of Basic Structure has to be considered in each individual case not in the abstract, but in the context of the concrete problem. The problem here is whether under our Constitution, judicial review was considered as an indispensable concomitant of elections to country's legislatures. The answer, plainly is no. 669. In England, prior to 1770 controverted elections were tried by the whole House of Commons as mere party questions but in order “to prevent so notorious a perversion of justice”, the House consented to submit the exercise of its privilege to a Tribunal composed of its own members.* In 1868, the jurisdiction of the House to try election petitions was transferred by statute to the Courts of Law. A Parliamentary election petition is now tried by two judges from out of three puisne judges of the Queen's Bench Division who are put on the rota for trial of such petitions by selection every year by a majority of votes of the Judges of that Division. At the conclusion of the trial the Court must forthwith certify the determination to the Speaker. The determination, upon such certification is final to all intents and purposes. Thus in England, the Election Court is constituted by a special method, it exercises a jurisdiction out of the ordinary jurisdiction which is normally exercised by Courts of Law and its determination acquires finality upon certification to the Speaker of the House of Commons. No appeal lies against the decision of the Election Court save by leave of the Court and if leave is granted, the decision of the Court of Appeal is final and conclusive.** 670. Under Article 1, Section 5, Clause 1 of the American Constitution each House is the judge of the elections returns and qualificatins of its own members. Each House, in judging of elections under this clause, acts as a judicial tribunal.* Any further review of the decisions of the two Houses seems impermissible. 671. I am, therefore, unable to accept the contention that Articles 329A (4) and (5) are unconstitutional on the ground that by those provisions, the election of the Prime Minister is placed beyond the purview of courts.