6/25/2020
Details of 2017 (Gyo-Tsu) 47 | Judgments of the Supreme Court
unconstitutionality, and the Provisions on the Apportionment of Seats
cannot be held to have been unconstitutional.
4. For the reasons stated above, we can affirm the determination of
the court of prior instance stating in its conclusion that the Provisions
on the Apportionment of Seats cannot be held to have been
unconstitutional at the time of the Election. We cannot accept the
arguments of the appellants and appeal counsel.
Therefore, the judgment has been rendered in the form of the main
text by the unanimous consent of the Justices, except that there are
opinions by Justice KIUCHI Michiyoshi and Justice HAYASHI Keiichi,
and dissenting opinions by Justice ONIMARU Kaoru and Justice
YAMAMOTO Tsuneyuki.
The concurring opinion by Justice KIUCHI Michiyoshi is as follows.
I am in agreement with the majority opinion that the Provisions on the
Apportionment of Seats cannot be held to have been unconstitutional
at the time of the Election. However, with regard to whether or not the
disparity in the value of votes indicated the existence of extreme
inequality to such an extent that it could raise a question of
unconstitutionality at the time of the Election, I dissent from the
majority opinion.
The reasons for my opinion are as follows.
1. Equality in the value of votes and constitutional review
As the value of votes in the elections of Diet members is the
substance of the right to vote held by the people under the
Constitution, equality in the value of votes is required by the
Constitution as a fundamental principle for the Diet to be composed
by members representing all the people, and is the most important
and fundamental criterion that should be considered in deciding an
election system.
It is obvious that the Diet is in charge of establishing an election
system by law under the Constitution, and the legislative process is
left to the Dietʼs discretion. However, the grounds for seeking
compromise on the part of equality in the value of votes, which is
appreciated as a constitutional value, must be reasonable ones, such
as those supported by other constitutional values or those due to
unavoidable technical restrictions.
The explanation that equality in the value of votes is not the sole and
absolute criterion for deciding the mechanism of an election system
has been adhered to by judgments of the Grand Bench on elections of
members of the House of Councillors that has been rendered since
the 1983 Grand Bench Judgment. This explanation does not deny that
equality in the value of votes is the most important and fundamental
criterion. The former judgment of the Grand Bench (1963 (O) No. 422,
judgment of the Grand Bench of the Supreme Court of February 5,
1964, Minshu Vol. 18, No. 2, at 270) held that,“from the constitutional
principle of equality under the law, it is desirable to apportion seats
for members to respective constituencies in proportion to the
population of voters, …but in what proportion seats for members
should be apportioned to respective constituencies is a matter of
legislative policy subject to the authority of the Diet, which is the
legislative body.”In contrast to this judgment, the 1983 Grand Bench
Judgment presented a principle that“the principle of equality of the
right to vote stipulated in the Constitution also requires…equality of
the substance of the right to vote, that is, equality of the weight of
each vote.”The explanation that equality in the value of votes is not
the sole and absolute criterion was stated on the basis of this
principle. Therefore, it is construed that the explanation remained
only confirming the Dietʼs discretion in the context that the Diet is not
https://www.courts.go.jp/app/hanrei_en/detail?id=1534
10/24
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