6/25/2020 Details of 2017 (Gyo-Tsu) 47 | Judgments of the Supreme Court unconstitutionality, and the Provisions on the Apportionment of Seats cannot be held to have been unconstitutional. 4. For the reasons stated above, we can affirm the determination of the court of prior instance stating in its conclusion that the Provisions on the Apportionment of Seats cannot be held to have been unconstitutional at the time of the Election. We cannot accept the arguments of the appellants and appeal counsel. Therefore, the judgment has been rendered in the form of the main text by the unanimous consent of the Justices, except that there are opinions by Justice KIUCHI Michiyoshi and Justice HAYASHI Keiichi, and dissenting opinions by Justice ONIMARU Kaoru and Justice YAMAMOTO Tsuneyuki. The concurring opinion by Justice KIUCHI Michiyoshi is as follows. I am in agreement with the majority opinion that the Provisions on the Apportionment of Seats cannot be held to have been unconstitutional at the time of the Election. However, with regard to whether or not the disparity in the value of votes indicated the existence of extreme inequality to such an extent that it could raise a question of unconstitutionality at the time of the Election, I dissent from the majority opinion. The reasons for my opinion are as follows. 1. Equality in the value of votes and constitutional review As the value of votes in the elections of Diet members is the substance of the right to vote held by the people under the Constitution, equality in the value of votes is required by the Constitution as a fundamental principle for the Diet to be composed by members representing all the people, and is the most important and fundamental criterion that should be considered in deciding an election system. It is obvious that the Diet is in charge of establishing an election system by law under the Constitution, and the legislative process is left to the Dietʼs discretion. However, the grounds for seeking compromise on the part of equality in the value of votes, which is appreciated as a constitutional value, must be reasonable ones, such as those supported by other constitutional values or those due to unavoidable technical restrictions. The explanation that equality in the value of votes is not the sole and absolute criterion for deciding the mechanism of an election system has been adhered to by judgments of the Grand Bench on elections of members of the House of Councillors that has been rendered since the 1983 Grand Bench Judgment. This explanation does not deny that equality in the value of votes is the most important and fundamental criterion. The former judgment of the Grand Bench (1963 (O) No. 422, judgment of the Grand Bench of the Supreme Court of February 5, 1964, Minshu Vol. 18, No. 2, at 270) held that,“from the constitutional principle of equality under the law, it is desirable to apportion seats for members to respective constituencies in proportion to the population of voters, …but in what proportion seats for members should be apportioned to respective constituencies is a matter of legislative policy subject to the authority of the Diet, which is the legislative body.”In contrast to this judgment, the 1983 Grand Bench Judgment presented a principle that“the principle of equality of the right to vote stipulated in the Constitution also requires…equality of the substance of the right to vote, that is, equality of the weight of each vote.”The explanation that equality in the value of votes is not the sole and absolute criterion was stated on the basis of this principle. Therefore, it is construed that the explanation remained only confirming the Dietʼs discretion in the context that the Diet is not https://www.courts.go.jp/app/hanrei_en/detail?id=1534 10/24

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